

CHAPTER 28

Culture and Subjective Well-Being

WILLIAM TOV
ED DIENER

With great perseverance
He meditates, seeking
Freedom and happiness.
—THE BUDDHA, Chapter 2, *The Dhammapada*

Over 2,000 years ago, the Buddha perceived suffering to be the nature of existence. But for him, the attainment of nirvana was not simply a break from this cycle of suffering, it was also a return to true bliss. Although it was not the direct purpose of meditation, happiness was certainly an important consequence, and a critical topic in Buddhist philosophy (Gaskins, 1999). Across time and cultures, generations of people have in their own way reflected upon the question of happiness. As long as it has been pondered, it may come as a surprise that the scientific study of happiness, or subjective

well-being (SWB; E. Diener, 1984) has advanced only recently.

One of the challenges has been defining happiness in a way that enables it to be measured. Given that conceptions of happiness may vary across different societies, a number of questions arise regarding *how* culture influences the idea and experience of happiness. Do the structure and content of SWB differ? Do certain cultures emphasize some components more than others? Are the correlates and causes of happiness similar across cultures? Do people react differently to the expe-

rience of well-being (e.g., when they feel pleasant affect)?

As it has been studied over the past two decades, SWB involves frequent pleasant emotion, infrequent unpleasant emotion, and life satisfaction (LS). The first two components are affective; the last is a cognitive evaluation. These three components are not the only elements of SWB. Happiness also can be said to consist of other dimensions, such as meaning and purpose in life. However, in this review we focus on LS, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect, in part because these constructs have been researched more frequently across cultures. Furthermore, these components of SWB are major focal points that allow for a certain degree of precision in measuring the fuzziest, folk concept of happiness.

WHY STUDY SWB ACROSS CULTURES?

The cross-cultural study of SWB is one indicator of the quality of life in a society. It was once considered taboo to suggest that societies could be evaluated at all (Shweder, 2000). To appraise *any* aspect of a culture was to ignore its worth and integrity. However, this extreme form of cultural relativism has given way to the view that though one must be careful in comparing and evaluating, societies may differ in variables such as health and satisfaction that are desirable in most cultures. It is true that some indicators of life quality may impose values about the good life that are not shared by all people. However, even if SWB is internally framed with respect to each culture, societies could still be evaluated in terms of how well they succeed according to these internal criteria.

Culture and SWB research can also shed light on basic emotional processes. In measuring SWB across various societies, researchers have confronted issues regarding the universality of emotions, and how the representation of emotions in memory is influenced by cultural norms. The field can also add to our understanding of culture. For example, how do cultures differ in their socialization of pleasant and unpleasant affect, and how do emotions contribute to the reinforcement of cultural values and practices? These questions reflect a cultural-psychological perspective. Thus, the topic is of both applied and theoretical importance.

HISTORY OF THIS FIELD OF INQUIRY

Anthropologists adopted cultural relativity as a way of avoiding a Western, ethnocentric bias in observing other cultures. They made the important observation that values and practices might vary across cultures, but this need not imply that some cultures are necessarily better than others. In particular, we should avoid judging other cultures by the standards of our own. However, taken to extremes, cultural relativism would prevent one from saying that Nazi Germany, or Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, were in many respects undesirable cultures (Edgerton, 1992). This level of extreme value relativity would make cultural psychology irrelevant to public discourse. According to Edgerton, not all practices in a culture are adaptive; some may even be harmful. He defined "maladaptive cultures" as those in which there is rampant dissatisfaction or impaired physical and mental health. Thus, there are certain criteria by which we can judge the success of a culture. As one such criterion, SWB is important because a society functions poorly when a majority of its people are discontent and depressed.

It should be noted that very little quantitative work has examined the well-being of small cultures (e.g., Biswas-Diener, Vittersø, & Diener, 2005), although a number of international surveys of SWB in modern nations have been conducted (e.g., Cantril, 1965; Inglehart, 1990; see Table 28.1). Only recently has research examined the structure and causes of SWB in different cultures. In 1995, for example, E. Diener and M. L. Diener found that self-esteem correlated more strongly with LS in individualist than in collectivist cultures, and that financial satisfaction more strongly predicted LS in poor than in rich nations. Since then, there has been a rapid growth in the field of culture and well-being, and both universal and unique correlates of SWB have been documented. We foresee further growth in this research area in the decade to come.

GENERAL APPROACHES TO CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS OF SWB

The comparisons that researchers make across cultures are guided by their assumptions about the interplay between culture and SWB. We review some of these approaches here.

TABLE 28.1. LS in Various Nations (1999–2002)

| Nation | Year | LS | SD | Nation | Year | LS | SD |
|------------------|------|------|------|--------------------|------|------|------|
| Puerto Rico | 2001 | 8.49 | 1.97 | Vietnam | 2001 | 6.52 | 2.06 |
| Denmark | 1999 | 8.24 | 1.82 | Japan | 2000 | 6.48 | 1.97 |
| Malta | 1999 | 8.21 | 1.62 | Peru | 2001 | 6.44 | 2.40 |
| Ireland | 1999 | 8.20 | 1.83 | Iran | 2000 | 6.38 | 2.41 |
| Mexico | 2000 | 8.14 | 2.35 | South Africa | 2001 | 6.31 | 2.69 |
| Iceland | 1999 | 8.05 | 1.59 | South Korea | 2001 | 6.21 | 2.32 |
| Austria | 1999 | 8.03 | 1.92 | Poland | 1999 | 6.20 | 2.53 |
| Northern Ireland | 1999 | 8.00 | 1.75 | Morocco | 2001 | 6.06 | 2.54 |
| Finland | 2000 | 7.87 | 1.65 | Slovakia | 1999 | 6.03 | 2.22 |
| Netherlands | 1999 | 7.85 | 1.34 | Estonia | 1999 | 5.93 | 2.18 |
| Canada | 2000 | 7.85 | 1.88 | Hungary | 1999 | 5.80 | 2.42 |
| Luxembourg | 1999 | 7.81 | 1.87 | Bosnia-Herzegovina | 2001 | 5.77 | 2.39 |
| USA | 1999 | 7.66 | 1.82 | Bangladesh | 2002 | 5.77 | 2.18 |
| Sweden | 1999 | 7.64 | 1.86 | Algeria | 2002 | 5.67 | 2.86 |
| Venezuela | 2000 | 7.52 | 2.50 | Uganda | 2001 | 5.65 | 2.47 |
| El Salvador | 1999 | 7.50 | 2.43 | Montenegro | 2001 | 5.64 | 2.38 |
| Belgium | 1999 | 7.43 | 2.13 | Turkey | 2000 | 5.62 | 2.79 |
| Germany | 1999 | 7.42 | 1.96 | Serbia | 2001 | 5.62 | 2.47 |
| Great Britain | 1999 | 7.40 | 1.94 | Jordan | 2001 | 5.60 | 2.50 |
| Argentina | 1999 | 7.30 | 2.26 | Bulgaria | 1999 | 5.50 | 2.65 |
| Singapore | 2002 | 7.24 | 1.80 | Egypt | 2000 | 5.36 | 3.35 |
| Italy | 1999 | 7.17 | 2.11 | Latvia | 1999 | 5.27 | 2.39 |
| Chile | 2000 | 7.12 | 2.16 | Romania | 1999 | 5.23 | 2.77 |
| Spain | 1999 | 7.09 | 1.92 | Lithuania | 1999 | 5.20 | 2.66 |
| Czech Republic | 1999 | 7.06 | 1.97 | Albania | 2002 | 5.17 | 2.25 |
| Portugal | 1999 | 7.04 | 1.96 | India | 2001 | 5.14 | 2.23 |
| Israel | 2001 | 7.03 | 2.17 | Macedonia | 2001 | 5.12 | 2.72 |
| France | 1999 | 7.01 | 1.99 | Pakistan | 2001 | 4.85 | 1.46 |
| Indonesia | 2001 | 6.96 | 2.06 | Belarus | 2000 | 4.81 | 2.21 |
| Nigeria | 2000 | 6.87 | 2.32 | Russia | 1999 | 4.56 | 2.57 |
| Croatia | 1999 | 6.68 | 2.30 | Ukraine | 1999 | 4.56 | 2.59 |
| Greece | 1999 | 6.67 | 2.19 | Moldova | 2000 | 4.56 | 2.32 |
| Philippines | 2001 | 6.65 | 2.53 | Zimbabwe | 2001 | 3.95 | 2.79 |
| China | 2001 | 6.53 | 2.47 | Tanzania | 2001 | 3.87 | 3.22 |

Note. LS scores are based on responses to the question, "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole now?" on a 10-point scale from 1 (*dissatisfied*) to 10 (*satisfied*). Data from Veenhoven (n.d.).

Dimensional Approach

Some theorists hold that the causes of well-being are fundamentally the same for all people. Ryff and Singer (1998) posited that purpose in life, quality relationships, self-regard, and a sense of mastery are universal features of well-being. Self-determination theorists (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000) maintain that well-being hinges on the fulfillment of *innate* psychological needs such as autonomy, competence, and relatedness. If these sources of well-being are universal, they provide dimensions along which we can compare societies. Cultures should differ in SWB to the extent that they provide people with different levels autonomy, meaning, and relationships.

A related perspective is the universalist position on emotions. Drawing on diverse findings, some researchers propose that there are discrete, basic emotions that appear in all cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Plutchik, 1980; Tomkins, 1962, 1963). For example, facial expressions of anger, sadness, and joy appear early in infancy (Izard & Malatesta, 1987) and are easily recognized in many different cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1987). Facial expressions of laughing and crying among congenitally blind infants (Thompson, 1941) suggest that there may be genetic programs directing the expression of emotions. The possibility of biologically based, basic emotions is important, for it implies that we can compare people across so-

cieties on these emotions (however, see Ortony & Turner, 1990, for a critique of the basic emotions concept).

Uniqueness Approach

In contrast to the universalist approach, some ethnographers emphasize emotions as social constructions. According to these researchers, the very concept of emotion may differ across cultures. Lutz (1988) noted that Western ethnopsychologies often view emotions as hidden and private. In contrast, her work in Micronesia revealed that Ifalukian concepts of emotions are more public and relational. Cultures may also differ in their labeling of specific feelings. For example, according to Wierzbicka (1986) there is no word for "disgust" in Polish. Extreme versions of the uniqueness approach hold that emotions are purely a Western idea, and that internal experiences can be represented in countless ways across cultures. More moderate formulations, on the other hand, maintain that biologically based emotions may be universal, but that culture can significantly alter their development and labeling. Thus, although sadness is often considered a basic emotion with recognizable antecedents, the Tahitians do not appear to have such a label for it (Levy, 1982). Instead, they often refer to feelings of sickness or exhaustion, for which the causes are nonspecific. Although the uniqueness approach does not preclude the possibility of making comparisons across cultures (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1986), it takes as its starting point the culturally patterned subtleties of emotional experience.

Identity Approach

Another perspective on universality is that regardless of the specific elements, all cultures enjoy *identical levels* of SWB. Cultures may differ in their values and in the needs they fulfill, but people eventually adapt, leading all societies to be relatively happy. The identity approach likens well-being to a "hedonic treadmill" upon which people run but never change position. Only in cultures that are severely disrupted or experiencing trauma (e.g., warfare or famine) is adaptation impossible, resulting in widespread unhappiness. The identity perspective may sound absurd, but in Table 28.2, diverse groups appear to enjoy somewhat comparable levels of LS. For instance, the Amish, Inughuit,

TABLE 28.2. LS of Selected Groups

| Positive groups | LS |
|---|-----|
| Forbes richest Americans ^a | 5.8 |
| Pennsylvania Amish ^b | 5.8 |
| Inughuit (Inuit group from Northern Greenland) ^c | 5.8 |
| East African Maasai ^c | 5.4 |
| International college students (47 nations) ^b | 4.9 |
| Calcutta slum dwellers ^d | 4.6 |
| <i>Neutral point of scale = 4.0</i> | |
| Groups below neutral | LS |
| Calcutta sex workers ^d | 3.6 |
| Calcutta homeless ^d | 3.2 |
| California homeless ^b | 2.9 |

Note. LS scores are based on responses to the statement "You are satisfied with your life," on a 7-point scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

^a E. Diener, Horwitz, and Emmons (1985); ^b E. Diener and Seligman (2004); ^c Biswas-Diener et al. (2004); ^d Biswas-Diener and Diener (2001).

and Maasai all report LS that is not significantly different from the richest Americans, suggesting that material luxury is not necessary for well-being. All these groups may be meeting needs, such as for social relationships, that are critical for SWB. Thus, important conditions for happiness may be met in nonindustrial societies such as the Maasai. In contrast, the LS of the homeless indicates that not all groups are happy, and that people do not fully adapt to all conditions.

The Middle Path

In this chapter, we take a middle path. We argue that there are some universals, such as the tendency for people to be *slightly* happy, unless they are exposed to harsh conditions. Some variables, such as temperament and positive relationships, influence SWB in all cultures. There may also be common goals, such as the need for respect, that characterize people in all cultures. Furthermore, because cultural influences often permeate national boundaries, cultures are not completely independent of one another. However, each culture also retains unique qualities and should not be compared with others in a careless way. Not all comparisons of SWB are meaningful, because the value placed on certain subjective states, and the labels for them, of-

ten differ. The patterning of well-being may also vary across cultures, making it dangerous to compare variables at a high level of abstraction. Thus, although comparisons are possible, they should only be made with due care to take into account the unique factors present in various societies.

Cultural differences in SWB can be likened to differences between individuals. People can be compared on certain universal features such as height and weight. They can also be compared on factors such as health, but health is made up of many lower-order concepts that may relate to each other differently across individuals. Although societies can be compared in terms of individuals' longevity, patterns of illness differ across cultures. In a similar way, cultures can be compared on SWB, but there are also unique facets of well-being in each society that are best captured by specific descriptions of the local culture.

In the sections that follow, we cover several major topics in culture and SWB research. We begin with the issue of patterning and structure, examining how the elements of SWB cohere across societies. Next, we consider whether cultures differ in mean levels of SWB where the structures can be compared, and what factors might contribute to these differences. We then review various correlates and causes of SWB, showing both similarities and differences in cultural recipes for happiness. Following this discussion, we ask whether SWB leads to the same outcomes in different cultures, or whether there are unique effects that depend on the role of emotions in a culture. Finally, we assess the various challenges involved in measuring SWB across cultures, and the impact that measurement artifacts may have on the findings.

PATTERNING AND STRUCTURE

The validity of cross-cultural comparisons of SWB depends on how it is structured in different societies. If there are both universal and culture-specific emotions, do aggregates such as pleasant and unpleasant affect apply to all cultures? Is the concept of LS understood by people in all societies? Also, do the three components of SWB relate to each other similarly across cultures? We review the research bearing on these issues below.

Levels of Analyses

As discussed earlier, the existence of universal emotions has been debated for some time. Researchers have used a number of methodologies to answer the question of universality, including ethnography, facial expression recognition, and emotion taxonomies. After conducting cross-cultural research on facial expression recognition, Ekman and Friesen (1971; Ekman et al., 1987) suggested that happiness, anger, fear, sadness, and disgust are universal. However, there are also emotions that appear in some cultures but not others. Some appear to be labeling of specific situation–outcome pairings in relation to feelings. In Japan, for example, the term *kanashii* refers specifically to sadness arising from personal loss (Mesquita & Fridja, 1992). Other indigenous emotions seem to be complex blends, such as *aviman* in India, which has been described as “prideful, loving anger” (Scollon, Diener, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2004).

According to Mesquita, Fridja, and Scherer (1997), the debate over universality has hindered culture and emotion research by focusing on the mere presence of certain emotions in a culture rather than on how emotions are “practiced.” They argue that emotional experience is a process that includes appraisal of a situation, physiological reactions, overt behaviors, and other components. What distinguishes one emotion from another is the *pattern* of components. At a general level, universal patterns of emotional experience may exist due to innate, neurophysiological programs. For example, joy may inherently feel pleasant and evoke the urge to laugh or smile. However, at the level of specific components, cultural differences may abound. The *type* of events that elicit joy, or attempts to regulate it, may vary across societies.

The perspective provided by Mesquita et al. (1997) resonates with several lines of research on well-being. In assessing the cross-cultural applicability of pleasant and unpleasant affect, SWB researchers have not only been interested in *which* emotions are present, but also in how frequently they are experienced, how they are patterned, and how norms can shape the structure and composition of pleasant and unpleasant affect. In short, the field of culture and SWB has been concerned as much with the ecology, or practice, of emotions (Mesquita et al., 1997) as with the comparability of SWB across cultures. We see that the distinction be-

tween pleasant and unpleasant affect can be made at a general level, and that there are both similarities and differences in the specific aspects of these emotions.

Structural Evidence

In an early study, Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1984) found that the mood structure of Japanese participants formed two factors, identifiable as positive and negative affect. This two-factor structure was very similar to that of American participants. Hierarchical cluster analyses of emotion words from the United States, Italy, and China also revealed superordinate groupings of positive and negative emotions (Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). Pleasant and unpleasant emotion clusters were also observed in experience sampling data provided by Japanese, Indian, and two American samples (Scollon et al., 2004). Moreover, indigenous emotions that were included in the Japanese and Indian samples did not form separate clusters, but grouped together with the pleasant and unpleasant emotions.

M. L. Diener, Fujita, Kim-Prieto, and E. Diener (2004) studied the frequency of 12 emotions and found that they formed positive and negative clusters in seven regions of the world (Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe). Moreover, in virtually all of these regions, a core group of emotions consistently loaded onto either positive or negative clusters; that is, positive emotions included *pleasant*, *cheerful*, and *happy*, whereas negative emotions included *unpleasant*, *sad*, and *angry*. Similarly, Shaver et al. (1992) found that one positive (*joy*) and three negative emotions (*anger*, *sadness*, and *fear*) formed basic-level categories in all three cultures they studied. Thus, when speaking of emotion aggregates, there is compelling evidence that pleasant and unpleasant affect are perceived in all cultures. There is also support for the universality of particular emotions such as joy, anger, and sadness. However, cultural differences may arise regarding more specific emotions. For instance, outside of the core emotions, M. L. Diener et al. (2004) observed differences in how other emotions clustered. *Pride* clustered with positive emotions in Latin America, Western Europe, and East Asia, but with negative emotions in Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and West Asia. *Pride* also aligned with negative emotions among smaller

samples in India and Italy (Scollon et al., 2004; Shaver et al., 1992). These findings should be interpreted cautiously. The simple fact that *pride* clusters with negative emotions in a culture does not necessarily mean that it is experienced as a negative emotion. In the case of M. L. Diener et al.'s data, the cluster analyses were based on the frequency of experience and included weights for means, standard deviations, and correlations—any of which could have affected how emotion terms clustered. In those regions where *pride* was experienced less frequently, it clustered with the negative emotions, which were generally experienced less often than positive emotions. In contrast, *worry* and *stress* clustered with the positive emotions in Western Europe and East Asia, primarily because they were frequently experienced in those areas. Thus, emotional experience may be universal in some ways but culturally varied in others. Recently, Kuppens, Ceulemans, Timmerman, Diener, and Kim-Prieto (2006) found that although positive and negative affect emerged as strong universal intracultural dimensions, there were also smaller, but significant, nation-level dimensions of emotional experience on which nations could be discriminated.

Differences in the frequency of emotions may be related to cultural norms. For example, cultural norms might make some situations more common than others. Thus, the American cultural environment might afford more opportunities for self-enhancement (and the experience of *pride*), whereas the Japanese cultural environment might be more conducive to self-criticism (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). According to Markus and Kitayama (1994), normative social behavior and cultural models of the self might also shape the desirability of certain emotions. In individualist cultures, *pride* is an enjoyable emotion that highlights individual achievement, as well as success in meeting the cultural goals of autonomy and independence. However, in collectivist cultures, emotions resulting from sympathy and humility may feel good because they are consistent with the cultural goals of interdependence. Emotions that conflict with these norms may be deemphasized and less frequently experienced. Thus, *pride* may not be as valued in some collectivist Asian cultures because it is self-focusing and separates the individual from the group (Kitayama & Markus, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1994;

Scollon et al., 2004). In a similar way, the Oriyas in India devalue anger, because it is regarded as socially destructive (Menon & Shweder, 1994). On the other hand, shame¹ is viewed as a good emotion for *women* to have, because it is integral to sustaining the patriarchal order of society.

The Oriya case draws attention to *intra*-cultural variation in emotion norms; that is, norms may not apply or be uniformly perceived across all individuals within a culture. Eid and Diener (2001) investigated this issue by examining the desirability and appropriateness of pleasant and unpleasant affect in the United States, Australia, China, and Taiwan. They found that norms for pleasant emotions (e.g., joy, affection, pride, and contentment) were more heterogeneous in China and Taiwan than in the United States and Australia. For instance, the vast majority (83%) of Australians and Americans regarded all four pleasant emotions as appropriate. In contrast, only 9% of Chinese and 32% of Taiwanese felt this way. A majority of the Taiwanese (57%) had mixed feelings about pride, although joy, affection, and contentment were appropriate. A plurality of the Chinese (32%) felt that joy and affection were appropriate, but that pride was clearly inappropriate. Another class of individuals found only among the Chinese (16%) regarded all pleasant emotions as *inappropriate*. These findings suggest that culture may influence emotion norms in two ways. First, cultures may foster unique normative patterns, as observed in the Chinese sample. Second, some patterns may be pancultural, but their relative frequency within cultures may differ. All pleasant emotions are clearly favored in the United States and Australia. The ambivalence toward pride in China and Taiwan is consistent with previous research on collectivist Asian cultures.

However, the relation between emotion norms and emotional experience may not always be direct. Recent work by Tsai, Knutson, and Fung (2006) suggests that the emotions people value (ideal affect) are not necessarily the ones they experience most frequently (real affect), although the correlations are moderate. These researchers found that although cultural values predicted the *preference* for high- versus low-arousal pleasant emotions, the reported *frequency* of these emotions was better predicted by personality traits. Furthermore, norms may influence some emotions more than others. M. L. Diener et al. (2004) found that

the correlation between the appropriateness and frequency of an emotion was larger for "secondary" emotions such as pride, guilt, gratitude, and jealousy, than for the core emotions; that is, norms appear to predict more strongly the experience of secondary emotions than the experience of core emotions. Indeed, the main cultural differences in structure were due to how the secondary emotions clustered, and the various geopolitical regions diverged most in the frequency of these emotions. For example, people from Southeast Asia more frequently reported experiences of guilt and shame, whereas people from Latin America registered more pride than people from other areas. Also, norms for pride and guilt were more variable across cultures than norms for other emotions (Eid & Diener, 2001). Differences in the experience of peripheral emotions, such as pride, may reflect cultural ideologies regarding attribution styles, such as whether success should be attributed to the self or to the situation (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). In contrast, a core emotion such as happiness is much broader and may tend to follow from a range of outcomes that are considered good in each culture, so that valuing general happiness is likely to be more common across cultures.

In addition to emotions, there is also support for similarity in the structure of LS across cultures. Vittersø, Røysamb, and Diener (2002) carried out confirmatory factor analyses on the five items of the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; E. Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) and found that a one-factor model fit the data reasonably well in 41 nations. In all nations, the comparative fit index was above .90. This finding suggests that the SWLS measures a single construct, and that the concept of "life satisfaction" may be similarly understood across a wide range of cultures. That is not to say that the *criteria* for LS are universal; rather, people in a number of diverse cultures appear to react to queries about LS in a consistent way.

The Relation between Emotions and LS

Although the structure of emotions is somewhat consistent across cultures, and the items of the SWLS also seem to cohere reliably, the relation between emotions and LS may vary across cultures (Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Ahadi, 2002; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). Suh et al. examined

the relation between LS and affect balance (the difference in frequency of pleasant and unpleasant affect). They found that LS and affect balance correlated positively across 40 nations; thus, experiencing more pleasant than unpleasant affect predicted greater LS across cultures. However, the correlations were stronger in more individualist countries. Suh et al. (Study 2) also assessed cultural norms for LS by asking participants what they perceived to be the ideal level of LS in their culture. When LS was predicted from both emotions and perceived norms for LS, the former was highly predictive among individualist cultures, accounting for 76% of the variance in LS. In contrast, norms and emotions were equally predictive of LS in collectivist cultures, accounting for 39% and 40% of the variance, respectively. A possible explanation is that in individualist cultures, where personal goals and preferences are emphasized, emotions may be important because one's own feelings are often a relevant factor in one's judgments. However, in collectivist cultures, there may be a greater tendency to use norms as a guide for one's attitudes and behavior, and not be the "nail that stands out." Thus, when judging their LS, people from collectivist cultures might weigh norms at least as much as their own emotions. This raises the possibility that collectivists are simply responding in a normatively appropriate manner. Though it is difficult to rule out this alternative explanation, other data suggest that this is not invariably the case. For example, perceived norms for negative emotions were not reliably related to self-reported frequency of these emotions among Chinese and Taiwanese respondents (Eid & Diener, 2001; we discuss further methodological issues later in the chapter).

Conclusion

There are universals in the structure of SWB that make some comparisons possible. Pleasant affect, unpleasant affect, and LS are not unfamiliar concepts to most of the world's people. Nevertheless, to some degree, cultural norms shape which emotions are pleasant and unpleasant to feel. Therefore, when using aggregates such as pleasant and unpleasant affect, one must be careful, because specific emotions may cohere differently within the larger aggregate. The comparison of emotion aggregates should only be made with emotions that cohere similarly in each culture. Finally, emotions may

be more relevant to global LS in individualist cultures, where internal experience is highly valued. This difference highlights the importance of measuring emotions and LS as separate components of SWB; that is affective and cognitive evaluations of well-being reflect different aspects of the superordinate construct of SWB.

COMPARING THE MEAN LEVELS OF SWB OF CULTURES

In discussing the happiness of societies, it may seem surprising that a majority of people in the world report being happy. That is not to say that all of humanity is in a state of elation or jubilation, or that there is no variation across cultures in overall levels of well-being. A wide range of economic, sociocultural, and biological factors may affect the mean level of subjective well-being in a society, but in most cultures, the mean level is above neutral.

Most People Are Happy

A study involving 31 nations ($N = 13,118$) revealed that 63% of men and 70% of women reported positive levels of LS (E. Diener & Diener, 1995). These findings may be limited, in that many of the nations studied were fairly industrialized, and most of the participants were college students. However, E. Diener and Diener (1996) plotted the distribution of mean SWB responses from nationally representative samples from 43 nations and found that 86% were above the neutral point (see Table 28.1 for more data based on representative probability samples). Furthermore, positive levels of well-being appear to be fairly stable over time. National levels of SWB in the United States, Japan, and France fluctuated over a 46-year period but never dipped below neutral (Veenhoven, 1993). Positive levels of well-being have also been observed among smaller, nonindustrialized societies such as the Maasai in Kenya, the Inughuit in Greenland, and the Amish in the United States (Biswas-Diener et al., 2005).

The claim that "most people are happy" is not meant to deny that there remains significant ill-being and suffering in the world. It is important to note that data from the poorest nations of the world (e.g., Rwanda, Mozambique, and Afghanistan) are often lacking (see Table 28.1). Moreover, although most people

report levels of SWB above the midpoint, very few report being extremely happy. Only 4% of E. Diener and Diener's (1995) sample were at the top of the LS scale. Similarly, although the Maasai, Inughuit, and Amish were all significantly above neutral on several measures of SWB, a very small minority reported perfect LS, or *always* experiencing pleasant affect (Biswas-Diener et al., 2005). Thus, the skew in well-being seems to reflect a moderate form of happiness. Although measurement artifacts are an important concern (see "Methodological Issues"), the replicability of these findings across numerous societies and over a number of different methods is impressive.

Perhaps it should not seem so shocking that most people are at least mildly happy with their lives. Some researchers argue that a disposition toward pleasant affect facilitates exploratory behavior, which could have conferred evolutionary advantages (E. Diener & Diener, 1996; Fredrickson, 1998; Ito & Cacioppo, 1999). According to Ito and Cacioppo, the motivational system is slightly biased toward approach behavior, even in the absence of stimuli—a phenomenon called "positivity offset." Such a bias would be more advantageous than a purely neutral disposition, because, in the absence of danger, it would help humans learn more about their environment. As a consequence of broadening behavioral and attentional foci, positive emotions might also have helped humans to build social relationships and other resources important for survival (Fredrickson, 1998). The connection between pleasant affect and approach tendencies receives some support from a 27-nation study by Wallbott and Scherer (1988). With few cultural differences, participants reported that "moving toward" was an action tendency most characteristic of joy, whereas "withdrawing" was more typical of unpleasant emotions.

In light of this research, it becomes important to ask when and why a society falls below the midpoint of SWB. One observed trend is that people living in severe destitution often report being unhappy. Prostitutes and homeless people living in Calcutta, India, reported negative levels of LS (Biswas-Diener & Diener, 2001). The LS of Malaysian farmers living below the poverty line also fell below the midpoint (Howell, Howell, & Schwabe, 2006). Difficulty in meeting basic needs or other circumstances, such as lack of respect, might have decreased the well-being of these groups. In the

next section, we consider how economic factors might influence the SWB of a society.

Economic Development and Related Variables

The wealth of a nation frequently correlates with its level of SWB. Depending on whether one looks at purchasing power or per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the correlation between economic wealth and the SWB of a nation ranges from .58 to .84 (E. Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Inglehart & Klingemann, 2000; Veenhoven, 1991). As robust as this finding is, the exact process by which economic development increases happiness remains unclear.

Wealthier societies are better able to meet the basic needs of their citizens, and this contributes to SWB (E. Diener, Diener, et al., 1995). We consider the role of basic needs fulfillment in a later section. For now, it is also worth noting that economic development is often associated with many other social conditions. For example, wealth correlates with greater human rights, as well as greater equality (in income, access to education, and between the sexes; E. Diener, Diener, et al., 1995). Rights and equality also correlate with each other. Moreover, people in wealthier nations are often more satisfied with friends and home life (E. Diener & Suh, 1999). A possible explanation proposed by Ahuvia (2002) is that rising wealth alters the cultural environment by freeing the individual from economic dependence on his or her family. This independence could attenuate norms for reciprocity while facilitating the pursuit of individual happiness (e.g., by allowing one more choice in friends and lifestyle). Thus, several mechanisms are possible, and the various correlates of wealth make it difficult to isolate the unique contribution of wealth to SWB. The relation between economic development and SWB is thus entangled in a causal web of several factors, and future researchers need to separate their causal influences on SWB.

Aside from economic development, Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) suggested that national levels of SWB might also reflect historical factors. In 1997, the former communist states of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. had among the lowest levels of well-being—lower than nations with less wealth, but without a history of communism. Even after controlling for wealth, rights, and other variables, the number of years under communist rule nega-

tively predicted a nation's mean level of SWB. However, Inglehart and Klingemann warn against hasty praise for capitalistic or democratic societies. Although the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union was preceded by relatively low levels of SWB, it was followed by *even lower* levels of SWB (see also Veenhoven, 2001). Political instability and economic decline after the fall of communism may have created conditions inimical to SWB. These ideas require further research, especially as conditions change in the region.

Norms for Emotions

As mentioned earlier, the experience of well-being can be shaped by cultural norms regarding the desirability of LS or certain emotions (M. L. Diener et al., 2004; Suh et al., 1998). Desirable emotions might be experienced more frequently than those that are seen as inappropriate (M. L. Diener et al., 2004) or they may correlate more with general happiness (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Norms for emotions may explain why Asian—especially East Asian—samples often report lower SWB than those from Europe and the Americas (E. Diener & Diener, 1995; Kang, Shaver, Sue, Min, & Jing, 2003; Sheldon et al., 2004; Suh, 2002). Economic development may be a factor, but it cannot completely account for the lower SWB of East Asians. For example, Japan has greater purchasing power than many Latin American nations (E. Diener, Diener, et al., 1995), yet it reports lower SWB than do the latter (E. Diener & Suh, 1999; E. Diener & Oishi, 2000). This could be because Japanese and other Asians show a greater acceptance of unpleasant emotions than do people in the Americas (E. Diener & Suh, 1999). Moreover, East Asians may also value low activation positive affect (e.g., serenity) more than high activation positive affect (e.g., excitement) because the former emotions facilitate collectivist goals of attending to the social context (Tsai et al., 2006).

How might emotion norms translate into experience? One pathway is through the socialization of emotions in children (M. L. Diener & Lucas, 2004) and the willingness to report specific emotions, or through recall of which emotions are experienced (Oishi, 2002). Wirtz (2004) asked participants to report how they felt about past events, both currently and at the time of the event. Whether the emotions were pleasant or unpleasant, Japanese participants'

current feelings were less intense than their remembered feelings from the past. In contrast, European Americans reported significant decay for unpleasant but not pleasant emotions. Thus, cultural norms might also shape the relation between recalled emotions and current feelings, which might also influence judgments about current LS.

Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2002) suggested that East Asian views of pleasant and unpleasant emotions might be rooted in the dialecticism of Asian philosophies (e.g., Buddhism and Daoism) that have historically shaped these cultures. For example, in Chinese folk wisdom, both sides of a contradiction are equally likely, and a compromise between the two is preferable (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). East Asian emotion norms may be dialectical in the sense that a middle way between extreme pleasant and extreme unpleasant affect is considered desirable. In contrast, many Western European and Latin American cultures prefer pleasant over unpleasant affect. These cultural differences are reflected in emotion reports. Among participants from Western Europe and the Americas, the frequency of pleasant affect was inversely related to the frequency of unpleasant affect (Schimmack et al., 2002). Among Asian participants, however, this negative correlation was weak (see also Bagozzi, Wong, & Yi, 1999). Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (2000) actually observed a *positive* correlation between pleasant and unpleasant affect in Japan. Finally, over a 1-week period of experience sampling, Scollon et al. (2004) found that European Americans and Hispanic Americans experienced more pleasant affect than Asians and Asian Americans. Moreover, there were no differences in unpleasant emotions. Asians and Asian Americans did not experience as much pleasant affect as the other groups, but they were not biased in the direction of greater unpleasant affect either.

Are East Asians simply unhappy at worst and apathetic at best? Caution must be taken not to equate lower levels of well-being as *ill-being*. First, the SWB of East Asians is lower *in comparison to* Latin Americans and Western Europeans. Although mean levels of SWB are often lower among Asian samples, they are rarely below the neutral midpoint. Second, Kitayama and Markus (2000) note that balance and moderation are central to East Asian concepts of health. A preference for low- rather than high-activation positive affect may be

consistent with this perspective (Tsai et al., 2006).

Another source of cultural variation in emotion norms may be religious doctrine. Across 40 nations, Kim-Prieto and Diener (2004) found that Christians reported a greater frequency of happiness and less shame than Muslims, even after controlling for the effect of nations. A subsequent comparison of the emotion content of religious texts revealed that joy and love were more frequently mentioned in the New Testament, whereas shame and guilt were more frequently mentioned in the Quran. Thus, differences in norms or the socialization of emotions may be rooted in religious doctrine. An important implication of these findings is that the cultural forces that impinge on SWB may extend beyond ethnic and geographic delineations.

Genetic Differences

Might cultural differences in well-being be due to genetic differences between groups? Although much more research is needed, some individual differences in SWB may be related to genetics. Polymorphisms in the serotonin-related *5-HTT* gene have been linked to individual differences in anxiety (Lesch et al., 1996), as well as susceptibility to depression (Caspi et al., 2003). Lykken and Tellegen (1996) maintain that roughly half of the individual variance in SWB is related to genetic variation.

A limitation of this research is that it has been carried out within single societies, and effects *within* a sample may not necessarily be driven by the same causal forces as those *between* samples. Although there are ethnic and cultural differences in gene frequencies (Cavalli-Sforza, 1991), direct links between such differences and SWB have not yet been made. However, studies of infant temperament reinforce the possibility of genetic effects. Freedman and Freedman (1969) found ethnic differences in infants less than 4 days old. Compared to European American infants, Chinese American infants were calmer and less reactive to a cloth placed on their face. Similarly, 4-month-old infants in China exhibited less behavioral arousal than did European American and Irish infants (Kagan et al., 1994). Nevertheless, the role of socialization practices cannot be overlooked. In contrast to these findings, Ahadi, Rothbart, and

Ye (1993) found that 6-year-old Chinese children exhibited relatively more negative affectivity than did their European American peers. The authors suggested that strict Chinese socialization practices might foster a greater sensitivity to punishment, leading to more frequent negative affect. Thus, genetic influences do not rule out the impact of life circumstances on the various components of SWB. Recently, Diener and colleagues (E. Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006; Fujita & Diener, 2005) argued for a "soft set point" conception of SWB. People can adapt to many situations, and genes may account for some of the stability in SWB. However, life events and social conditions (e.g., widowhood or poverty) can still have a substantial impact on happiness at both individual and group levels. Much more research on culture, genetics, and SWB is required before firm conclusions can be made.

Conclusion

In many societies, a majority of the people report being happy, but very few report extreme happiness. Although there are biological and evolutionary accounts for why this is so, other factors are likely to influence mean levels of well-being. These factors include economic development and cultural norms for emotions. However, much more research is needed before we can understand exactly how and why societal levels of SWB differ across cultures. Specifically, the exact process underlying the relation between economic development and SWB remains unclear, as does how such development affects cultural values related to well-being.

CORRELATES AND CAUSES OF SWB

Cultures might differ in not only the type and frequency of emotions people experience but also in the causes of SWB. Often the evidence is in terms of cross-sectional correlations, however, so we mostly review what covaries with pleasant and unpleasant affect, and LS in different cultures. Furthermore, Kitayama and Markus (2000) suggested that SWB is not only personal happiness but also includes one's relations with others. Thus, happiness might take different forms across cultures, with different factors causing it.

The Self and SWB

To the extent that self-concepts vary across cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), one might expect the relation between self and SWB to vary as well. For instance, although self-esteem is often a strong correlate of LS, Heine et al. (1999) questioned the need for positive self-views in collectivist cultures. In Japan, where interdependence is emphasized, a self-critical tendency may be valued as a way of improving one's ability to meet social obligations (but see Brown & Kobayashi [2002, 2003] for evidence of self-enhancement in Japan, and Heine's [2003] response). Miller, Wang, Sandel, and Cho (2002) found that rural Taiwanese mothers also place little emphasis on developing their children's self-esteem, and some worried that high self-esteem would impair their child's capacity to take criticism. Thus, in collectivist cultures, self-esteem may be viewed as unimportant, or even *undesirable*, for achieving cultural goals. In contrast, a primary concern for European American mothers was to help their children develop and maintain a strong sense of self-esteem (Miller et al., 2002).

If high self-esteem is deemphasized in collectivist cultures, then one might expect self-esteem to relate less strongly to LS than it would in more individualist cultures. This is exactly what a number of researchers have found (E. Diener & Diener, 1995; Oishi, Diener, Lucas, & Suh, 1999; Park & Huebner, 2005). Although self-esteem correlated with LS across most countries, the strength of association could be predicted by the individualism of a country. For example, self-esteem and LS correlated .60 in the United States, but only .08 among women in more collectivist India (E. Diener & Diener, 1995). Similarly, Park and Huebner (2005) found that satisfaction with self was a much stronger predictor of LS for U.S. adolescents than for Korean adolescents. As with emotions (Suh et al., 1998), people in collectivist cultures may be guided by norms downplaying the importance of self-esteem when they make LS judgments. Alternatively, people with high self-esteem may be frowned upon in collectivist cultures for holding or expressing attitudes that violate norms. Of course, norms should also influence the factors that *do* correlate with LS. For example, Park and Huebner (2005) suggested that the heavy emphasis on academic achievement in Korea might explain why school satisfaction pre-

dicted LS for Korean adolescents but not for American adolescents.

Another characteristic that may be less socially valued in collectivist cultures and less important for SWB is identity consistency. In traditional Western psychology, self-consistency across situations implies a coherent self-identity and good mental health. However, in East Asian cultures, where individuals are expected to adjust themselves to the social situation, identity consistency might be taken as a sign of immaturity. Suh (2002) found that Americans evinced greater consistency than Koreans across social roles. For example, if Americans were talkative with their friends, they were also more likely to be talkative with parents, siblings, and strangers than were Koreans. Furthermore, identity consistency was a much stronger predictor of SWB for Americans than for Koreans. Not only were self-consistent individuals happier in the American sample, but they were also rated by informants as more likable and socially skilled than less consistent individuals. In contrast, Korean informants showed no such preference for consistent targets (Suh, 2002).

Culture may also affect the relation between personality and LS. On the one hand, research suggests that the influence of personality on emotional experience may be pancultural (Lucas, Diener, Grob, Suh, & Shao, 2000; Tsai et al., 2006). In five countries, Schimmack et al. (2002) found that extraversion correlated positively with affect balance, whereas neuroticism was negatively correlated. Moreover, the relation between personality and LS was mediated by affect balance. Thus, extraverts enjoy greater LS in part because they experience frequent pleasant affect. However, because the relation between *emotions* and LS is stronger in individualist cultures (see "Patterning and Structure"), the relation between personality and LS is also moderated by culture. Thus, extraversion and neuroticism are more predictive of LS in individualist cultures (Germany and the United States) than in collectivist cultures (Ghana, Japan, and Mexico). Extraverts everywhere may experience more pleasant affect than neurotics, but how much this contributes to LS may depend on the cultural value of emotional experience. Alternatively, Benet-Martínez and Karakitapoglu-Aygun (2003) proposed that cultures favor the development of some personality traits over others. They found that individualism predicted both

extraversion and neuroticism, and that the relationship between personality and LS was mediated by self-esteem and friendship satisfaction.

An important issue concerns the role of autonomy in SWB. Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000) contends that autonomy is a basic human need that, if not fulfilled, will lead to lower levels of well-being. One source of the debate may be the very definition of autonomy. For example, Oishi (2000) operationalized autonomy as horizontal individualism (i.e., an emphasis on independence and individual self-worth). He found that the positive association between autonomy and LS is stronger in more individualist nations such as Australia and Denmark, than in more collectivist nations such as China, Korea, and Bahrain. However, Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, and Kaplan (2003) argued that the construct of autonomy must be distinguished from independence and individualism (see also Ryan & Deci, 2000). In the framework of SDT, autonomy is the sense that one has willingly engaged in and fully endorses an act. Individuals may be dependent on others and still experience autonomy, if they find value in that dependence and engage in it of their own volition. What is of importance is the *internalization* of the values that one is exercising. Thus, although Koreans viewed their culture as more collectivist and less individualist than Americans viewed their own culture, the internalization of *both* types of values predicted SWB in both countries, as well as in Russia and Turkey (Chirkov et al., 2003). Using a similar definition of autonomy, Sheldon et al. (2004) found that self-concordant individuals (i.e., those who pursued goals they perceived as freely chosen) tend to report higher levels of SWB in the United States, South Korea, Taiwan, and China. Thus, autonomy as independence is not universal, whereas autonomy as feeling that one's behavior is freely chosen and not coerced may be universal.

These views are not contrary to the goal-as-moderator model advanced by Oishi (2000). This model posits that the relation between culture and SWB is moderated by personal goals. Culture may influence one's goals, but individuals do not always pursue culturally endorsed goals. For example, a Chinese student who values personal success may be happier studying alone than offering help to his fellow classmates, although the latter better reflects the

cultural goal of interdependence. However, although attaining personal goals may bring emotional well-being, it may not always yield a sense of meaning in life. Ideally, personal goals that are aligned with cultural values lead to both happiness and meaning (Oishi, 2000). Thus, the role of personal goals is similar to the importance of internalization proposed by SDT. Although independence from others might not predict happiness equally across cultures, acting from one's volition is predicted by both SDT and Oishi's theory to lead to happiness universally.

Both perspectives suggest that the distinction between personal and collective goals may often be blurred. For example, the SWB of Asians and Asian Americans is better predicted by satisfaction with goals involving family and friends than with goals concerned mainly with the self (Oishi & Diener, 2001; Radhakrishnan & Chan, 1997). However, among collectivist cultures, the goals of one's group may also be experienced as one's own (Markus & Kitayama, 1994), making them both collective and personal. In contrast, only personal goals were predictive of the SWB of European Americans (Oishi & Diener, 2001; Radhakrishnan & Chan, 1997). Taken together, the findings suggest that some motives may correlate universally with well-being, whereas other motives or goals are culture-specific correlates of well-being.

Relationships with Others and SWB

The preceding research implies that social relationships may influence SWB differently across cultures. For instance, although emotional experience is often considered private and internal, Kitayama and Markus (2000) suggested that the Japanese may experience good feelings *intersubjectively*, as features of an interpersonal situation that dissipate once the individual is out of that context. Consistent with this idea, Oishi, Diener, Scollon, and Biswas-Diener (2003) found that Japanese reported less pleasant affect when alone than did Americans. Furthermore, although both groups experienced more pleasant affect when with friends than when alone, the effect was greater for the Japanese (as well as for Hispanic Americans; Oishi et al., 2003).

In general, East Asians may be more other-focused in their emotional experience than North Americans (Cohen & Gunz, 2002;

Kitayama et al., 2000). Kitayama et al. compared how *engaged* (relationship focused) and *disengaged* (self-focused) emotions relate to general good feelings (e.g., happiness) among Japanese and American participants. For Japanese participants, positive engaged emotions (e.g., friendly feelings) correlated more strongly with general good feelings than did positive disengaged emotions (e.g., pride). The reverse was true for American participants. However, a recent priming study by No and Hong (2004) suggests that the influence of culture on emotional experience is dynamic. Compared to baseline, Korean American biculturals primed with Korean cultural icons became more relational and less egocentric in their projection of emotions onto others. Similar effects may be observed in the experience of SWB; that is, what makes an individual happy may shift as the salience of cultural frames shifts, such as when living in another culture for an extended period of time.

The relative importance of relationships across cultures also influences LS. Among Hong Kong Chinese, for example, relationship harmony was just as important as self-esteem in predicting LS (Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997). In contrast, self-esteem was a stronger predictor of LS for Americans. Interestingly, relationship quality may have both direct and indirect effects on LS. Kang et al. (2003) not only replicated Kwan et al.'s (1997) findings in the United States, Korea, and mainland China, but they also showed that relationship quality was positively associated with self-esteem in the latter two groups. Relationship quality was also predictive of Asian Americans' self-esteem, but *not* of European Americans' self-esteem (Kang et al., 2003).

A relationship of particular relevance to SWB is marriage. Across 42 societies, married people reported more pleasant and less unpleasant affect than the divorced (E. Diener, Gohm, Suh, & Oishi, 2000). However, small cultural effects were observed. Divorce seems to reduce pleasant affect to a lesser extent in collectivist than in individualist cultures. Gohm, Oishi, Darlington, and Diener (1998) found that in collectivist cultures, the offspring of divorced parents reported greater LS than those whose parents remained in high-conflict marriages. These groups did not differ in individualist cultures. Both findings could be related to greater social support in collectivist cultures, which would help to sustain well-be-

ing after divorce. Alternatively, the pressure to stay together may be greater in these societies, so that couples divorce only after severe marital conflict. In this case, the decision to divorce might offer greater relief to spouses and their offspring. More research is needed to test these hypotheses.

Income and SWB

According to Veenhoven (1991), income contributes to SWB only insofar as it allows one to fulfill basic needs. Beyond the level needed to satisfy physical needs, income has less of an impact on SWB. Veenhoven's theory resembles that of Maslow (1954), which posits that lower-order needs (e.g., physical and security needs) must be gratified before higher-order needs (i.e., belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization) become salient. However, some scholars have questioned whether the fulfillment of needs follows a linear hierarchy (Yang, 2003). Moreover, diminishing returns on the effects of material goods do not always imply that higher-order needs have been prioritized. An implication drawn from both theories, however, is that income has a greater impact on SWB in poor societies, because physical needs such as having adequate food, water, and housing are highly salient, and the effects of income on meeting these needs are direct. Indeed, researchers have found that financial satisfaction predicts LS more strongly in poorer than in wealthier countries (E. Diener & Diener, 1995; Oishi et al., 1999).

Although the relation between income and happiness is reduced among the wealthier nations, it is worth noting that income still contributes to SWB *beyond* the basic subsistence level (Diener, Diener, et al., 1995; E. Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Diener, 1993). Perhaps greater amounts of income facilitate the pursuit of other goals (e.g., relationships or philanthropy) that add to one's level of SWB, though little is known about *how* money is spent across cultures.

Although Maslow's needs hierarchy provides some understanding of the link between income and SWB, it is important to consider recent revisions of and critiques on the cross-cultural applicability of this model. Yang (2003) argued that Maslow's higher-order needs (belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization) are framed within an individualist context. He suggested that in collectivist

societies, these needs are framed in ways that reaffirm social relationships and group identity. Moreover, he proposed (after Yu, 1992, cited in Yang, 2003) that bearing and rearing children be considered needs that are present in all societies, because they ensure the transmission of genes to the next generation. Unlike the strictly hierarchical nature of Maslow's model, Yang suggested that needs can be experienced and fulfilled simultaneously. For example, raising children may fulfill both belongingness and esteem needs. Furthermore, individuals may emphasize or deemphasize transmission needs throughout the life course. The relative importance of child-rearing versus esteem needs might also differ across cultures, and the role that income plays in satisfying these needs could likewise vary.

Conclusion

A number of correlates of SWB are strikingly different across cultures, yet some correlates appear to be universal. Variations in the cognitive and affective experience of happiness correspond with cultural differences in self-definition and the importance of social relationships. Income also contributes to SWB, though the relation is stronger among poorer than among wealthier societies. Thus, cultural-psychological differences are rooted not only in values but also in the material world. However, because culture is dynamic, what makes people happy may change across generations, as well as within the individual, as different aspects of a culture become salient. Nevertheless, there may be some universal correlates of SWB even in the face of cultural variations, such as autonomous internalization of cultural values.

OUTCOMES OF SWB

Research on SWB has traditionally been a search for the who, what, and how of happiness—that is, who is happy, what makes people happy, and how the various components of happiness relate to each other. Because happiness has historically been thought of as an end in itself, these were the first questions to be asked, and the field of SWB advanced greatly as these issues began to be studied more rigorously. However, the question of *why* happiness is important has only recently received more serious attention.

Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) propose that although success may produce happiness, it may also be the case that happiness leads to success. They reviewed several experimental and longitudinal studies suggesting that many outcomes of pleasant affect are desirable (e.g., prosocial behavior, self-esteem, likability, creativity, and longevity). These characteristics in turn lead to success in many life domains, such as marriage, work, and health. The framework developed by Lyubomirsky et al. is an intriguing area that requires much more research. Not only does the direction of causality await further clarification in some domains but also the benefits and *costs* of pleasant affect must be investigated in a wider range of cultures.

The studies reviewed by Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) were conducted primarily in North America, Europe, and Australia. Whether pleasant affect is similarly beneficial in, for example, East Asia is certainly open for analyses. Would pleasant emotions produce similar outcomes in Japan, where self-criticism and self-improvement are seen as important for success (Heine et al., 1999)? Heine et al. (2001) observed that North Americans are more likely to persist on a task after receiving success feedback, whereas Japanese are motivated to persist if they receive failure feedback. The facilitative effect of pleasant affect among Westerners may be related to the general desirability of these emotions in their cultures (Eid & Diener, 2001). However, East Asian cultures do not devalue all pleasant emotions (e.g., Tsai et al., 2006). An important topic for future investigation is whether specific pleasant emotions are beneficial, whereas others (e.g., pride; Eid & Diener, 2001; Scollon et al., 2004) are detrimental for success in certain cultures.

At a societal level, Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) suggested that rising levels of SWB might help legitimize and stabilize newly formed governments. They pointed out that major political changes in Belgium and the former U.S.S.R. in the early 1990s were *preceded* by decreasing levels of SWB. Furthermore, although many democratic societies had high levels of well-being, democracy did not predict SWB after controlling for gross national product (GNP; Inglehart & Klingemann, 2000). Thus democratic institutions may increase SWB through rising wealth, but greater SWB might also help to sustain these institutions. These propositions are preliminary, and more research is required to understand the causal

process. Measuring national levels of SWB consistently and over a broad period of time could shed light on how fluctuations in well-being relate to sociopolitical developments.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

A critical question is whether measures of SWB are valid and reliable across cultures. Even within cultures, Schwarz and Strack (1999) pointed out several potential threats to the validity of self-reported SWB. They warned that self-reports are vulnerable to contextual factors (e.g., question wording and order effects) that can change the standards by which people evaluate their lives. However, Schimmack, Diener, and Oishi (2002; Oishi, Schimmack, & Colcombe, 2003) showed that the information people use to make LS judgments is largely systematic and personally relevant. Thus, although self-reports of SWB may be subject to momentary influences, more often than not, they convey meaningful information about an individual's evaluation of his or her life.

Nevertheless, there are additional challenges when SWB research is conducted across cultures. A basic issue is the adequate translation of written materials. Poor translations can alter the intended meaning of SWB measures, leading to spurious cultural differences. A number of studies, however, suggest that translation effects are unlikely to explain the substantial cultural differences that have been observed. For example, bilingual Chinese reported lower life satisfaction than bilingual European Americans, whether they completed the SWLS in Chinese or in English (Shao, 1993). Similarly, M. L. Diener et al. (2004) gathered reports of emotional experience from multiple locations in China, Singapore, and India. Within the same country, some subsamples completed the survey in the local language, whereas others completed an English version. Results indicated that subsamples *within* a nation were more similar in emotional experience, regardless of the language used. Cultural differences obtained with translated measures of SWB have also been substantiated by *non*-self-report measures (Balatsky & Diener, 1993; Biswas-Diener et al., 2005). For instance, not only did Russians report lower SWB than Americans, they also recalled proportionately less positive events than did the latter (Balatsky & Diener, 1993).

Another issue is whether the use of numbers, or unfamiliarity with Likert scales could affect findings. In the slums of Calcutta, Biswas-Diener and Diener (2001) supplemented their 7-point Likert scales with a gradient of frowning and smiling faces. Some respondents were still confused by the task, forcing the researchers to reduce their measures to a 3-point scale. Despite these initial difficulties, they obtained an alpha coefficient of .80 for the SWLS. Still, when conducting research in certain cultures, the novelty of psychological testing can result in lower reliabilities (e.g., Biswas-Diener et al., 2005). Moreover, the reliability of the SWLS was found to correlate positively with the GNP of a nation (Vittersø et al., 2002). Higher reliabilities do not completely account for the greater LS found in wealthier nations, but they do appear to influence results and may be due to greater familiarity with psychological testing in those countries. Nevertheless, measures of LS and happiness are predictive of social integration and elderly suicide rates across nations (Wu & Bond, 2006), providing some evidence that these measures are capturing important aspects of people's life experiences.

Different response styles have occasionally been proposed as an explanation for cultural differences in well-being, especially with regard to the lower SWB among Asian samples. One hypothesis is that due to humility norms, Asian respondents tend toward neutrality by overselecting responses at the midpoint of the scale. E. Diener, Suh, Smith, and Shao (1995) examined this possibility among Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and American samples but did not find such a tendency. East Asians showed as much variation as Americans in their satisfaction with various domains. The former even reported a greater range of emotional intensity than the latter. Similarly, Veenhoven (2001) showed that negative response tendencies are unlikely to explain the lower levels of SWB among Russians. Interestingly, the lower scores on SWB run counter to the finding that acquiescence bias (the tendency to respond in agreement with items) tends to be higher in collectivistic nations (Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Smith, 2004). If acquiescence influences responses on SWB measures, one would expect to see higher means in East Asia, but this is clearly not the case.

On the other hand, social desirability may underlie some differences in reported SWB. In

cultures where LS and pleasant affect are considered desirable, there may be a tendency to project higher SWB. People in some cultures appear to have a "positivity bias," in which satisfaction with global domains (e.g., education) are high even though satisfaction with more specific domains (e.g., textbooks, professors, and lectures) are *lower* on average (E. Diener, Scollon, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Suh, 2000). E. Diener, Scollon, et al. found that this positivity bias predicted LS beyond objective measures such as income, and that it correlated positively with norms for LS. This finding may explain the discrepant relation between wealth and happiness in Japan and Latin America. Latin Americans exhibited high desirability for LS, as well as a strong positivity bias. In contrast, Japanese and other East Asians reported lower desirability for LS and a corresponding *negativity* bias, such that global satisfaction was lower than would be expected from specific domain satisfactions (E. Diener, Scollon, et al., 2000). These biases could be considered artifacts, but they may also represent interesting cultural phenomena in and of themselves. Furthermore, it is worth reiterating that cultural differences in satisfaction judgments and emotional experience have been observed using other methodologies. For instance, a 1-week daily diary study showed that European Americans' global past-week satisfaction was more positive than their average satisfaction for *each day* of that week (Oishi, 2002). In contrast, Asian American participants did not exhibit a significant bias in global versus daily satisfaction ratings. Similarly, Kim-Prieto (2005) found that European Americans and Asians were similar in happiness reported "now," but Asians reporting feeling less during the past year and "in general." Finally, the recall of *pleasant*, but not unpleasant emotions during a vacation predicted the desire of European Americans to repeat the trip, whereas for Asian Americans the reverse was true (Wirtz, 2004). Interestingly, experience-sampling data revealed that the two groups did not differ in their *online* experience of pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Thus, the global judgment, and not the specific reports, influenced participants' decisions. Instead of dismissing global judgments altogether, E. Diener, Scollon, et al. (2000) suggested that global and domain-specific judgments are both distinctly informative aspects of SWB. Nevertheless, cross-cultural researchers should continue to use

multiple methods (memory measures, informant reports, etc.) whenever possible.

Perhaps a fundamental concern is whether it is appropriate to use nations as a proxy for studying culture. Researchers often define groups by their countries of origin and attribute any differences among these groups to culture. However, culture is not necessarily confined to geopolitical boundaries (Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Hong & Chiu, 2001). By equating entire nations with single cultures, we risk overlooking important differences within nations, as well as similarities that extend beyond national borders. In the case of emotion norms, many different norm patterns for pleasant and unpleasant affect may coexist within a nation (Eid & Diener, 2001). At the same time, however, nations within a certain *region* (e.g., East Asia or Latin America) appear to have similar patterns of emotional experience (M. L. Diener et al., 2004).

It is not entirely meaningless to group samples by nation. People living within a country are likely to have shared experiences and common histories, which are crucial in the formation of a common culture. Still, cultural entities may be defined at different levels, in any number of ways. It is important to realize the trade-offs inherent at a given level of analysis. Speaking of "regional cultures" allows us to make generalizations, but at the sacrifice of specificity. A focus on subcultural grouping may provide rich, nuanced data, but at the cost of generalizability. A further point is that culture is dynamic. The penetration of Western media and popular culture into other parts of the world can stimulate cultural change, leading to generational differences within nations. Thus, different age groups within a nation might differ in their attitudes and experience of SWB. More longitudinal research is needed to disentangle cohort effects from developmental effects.

Finally, group differences in SWB might be related to socioeconomic status (SES), not just to cultural beliefs and values per se. Income and education levels can determine the quality of life for people in a society, which in turn could lower or raise SWB. However, SES may sometimes be confounded with cultural groupings, especially when a history of discrimination has prevented certain groups from attaining higher status (Betancourt & López, 1993). Apart from discrimination, people from high versus low SES groups may face different reali-

ties and prioritize different values and beliefs (e.g., Snibbe & Markus, 2005). In either case, controlling for SES would result in a removal of cultural effects as well. Thus, separating SES from culture may not always be a straightforward task. On the other hand, cultural effects that persist even after controlling for socioeconomic variables pose interesting questions for future research and theory (see Rice & Steele, 2004) concerning the nature of culture and how it should be operationalized.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Although cultural variations in SWB have been replicated across self-report and memory measures, an important agenda for future research is to determine the extent to which these differences are reflected in the actual experience of well-being. More frequent applications of the experience-sampling method across cultures will provide further clarification of such differences. In one of the few such studies, Scollon et al. (2004) found that cultural differences in reports of past emotional experience do have some basis in online experience, but they also reflect aspects of the self-concept that independently influence the recall of emotions. These findings are provocative, but they must be replicated across more cultures. Other methods of assessing SWB, such as Kim's (2004) implicit association measure of LS, have only recently been developed and could provide further insights. Also critical will be the further development and integration of biological markers of well-being. For example, a predisposition toward positive affectivity has been linked to individual differences in chronic left-brain activation (Ito & Cacioppo, 1999). The immune system and neurotransmitter systems (e.g., serotonin and dopamine) may also play a role in well-being. These and other types of measures will help us know whether differences in SWB lie in actual experience or only in self-reports.

There is also a continuing need for theory on the functioning of SWB in culture—how it is defined in each culture, how it supports culture, and the types of outcomes associated with SWB in various societies. SWB is an important criterion for evaluating the success of a society, but by itself it is insufficient. To be happy in the face of starvation or inequality would seem preposterous to most people. Happiness and cultural conceptions of the good life are often

tied to the sociomoral fabric of a society. As Markus and Kitayama (1994) suggested, being a competent member of one's culture typically "feels good" or "right." Thus, in some ways, LS may involve an implicit moral judgment on one's life, or on oneself as a person. Future studies of indigenous concepts of well-being, as well as the relation of SWB to the moral structures of a society, will help researchers further contextualize their interpretations of SWB.

Finally, viewing culture dynamically will enhance our understanding of cultural variation in SWB. Dynamic constructionists (e.g., Hong & Chiu, 2001) suggest that the influence of culture is not rigid and sweeping, but that it can fluctuate with the social context. Particularly among immigrants and other individuals who have been exposed to multiple cultures, *which* culture is influential may depend on cues in the environment (e.g., at home vs. at school) that activate different sets of cultural knowledge. An intriguing issue is how such cultural frame switching might moderate the relation between LS and correlates such as self-esteem. How bicultural individuals feel about and integrate their cultural identities (Haritatos & Benet-Martínez, 2002; Kim, Sarason, & Sarason, 2006) might also influence their well-being as they navigate between different cultural contexts. A related topic is how the causes of SWB change across the lifespan, or across different cohorts within the same culture. Thus, dynamic cultural perspectives contribute to a more fluid notion of SWB, raising new questions about the structure of well-being and its outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS

We have learned that comparisons of well-being are possible for some variables, and that there are probably some universal causes of well-being and ill-being. At the same time, we have learned that fascinating differences exist between cultures in the patterning and content of SWB variables, as well as in the causes and correlates of SWB. These differences should guide us in our attempts to make valid comparisons. For instance, some emotions may be understood similarly across cultures, whereas others have different connotative meanings. Direct comparisons, then, should be made with the former and not the latter. Even where SWB components are different, we could compare

cultures according to their own criteria by measuring the attainment of culturally valued goals and experiences. Such an approach to well-being still allows us to assess success in different cultural contexts.

The effect size of culture on well-being can vary depending on the specific component of SWB under study. Cultures perhaps vary more in frequency and perceived norms for pleasant emotions than for unpleasant emotions (Eid & Diener, 2001; Scollon et al., 2004). In the case of unpleasant emotions, there is a stronger trend toward much larger differences within than between cultures. The uneven effects of culture on SWB not only resonate with dynamic views of culture but also call for circumspection in the type of inferences we draw from societal levels of SWB.

Much has been learned in the past decade of research in culture and SWB. Researchers began by making simple comparisons of nations on life satisfaction and happiness. Next they began to ask questions about the validity of measures across cultures, and about the causes and correlates of SWB in different societies. The field continues to advance, with more sharply focused research questions concerning *when* cultural influences come into play, *which* aspects of well-being are affected, and *what* the outcomes of SWB are across cultures. We are also entering an era in which research will treat culture as more dynamic, and individuals as bearers of more than one cultural tradition. These issues will continue to require multi-measure strategies and, we hope, stimulate the development of new methodologies. In this regard, progress in the various areas of cultural psychology and SWB, as well as more interdisciplinary work with the other social and biological sciences, will benefit both perspectives greatly.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank Sumie Okazaki for her helpful and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. This work was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship awarded to William Tov.

NOTE

1. The Oriya emotion *lajya* or *lajja* was translated by Menon and Shweder (1994) as shame. However, a less

negative, alternative translation is "feeling shy." These two emotions are related but not the same. We thank Vijay Kumar Shrotryia for this observation. Our point is simply that the meaning of an emotion (hence, its value) can shift in different cultural contexts in ways that are not obvious from its valence alone.

REFERENCES

- Ahadi, S. A., Rothbart, M. K., & Ye, R. (1993). Children's temperament in the US and China: Similarities and differences. *European Journal of Personality*, 7, 359-377.
- Ahuvia, A. C. (2002). Individualism/collectivism and cultures of happiness: A theoretical conjecture on the relationship between consumption, culture and subjective well-being at the national level. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 3, 23-36.
- Bagozzi, R. P., Wong, N., & Yi, Y. (1999). The role of culture and gender in the relationship between positive and negative affect. *Cognition and Emotion*, 13, 641-672.
- Balatsky, G., & Diener, E. (1993). Subjective well-being among Russian students. *Social Indicators Research*, 28, 225-243.
- Benet-Martínez, V., & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, Z. (2003). The interplay of cultural syndromes and personality in predicting life satisfaction: Comparing Asian Americans and European Americans. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 34, 38-60.
- Betancourt, H., & López, S. R. (1993). The study of culture, ethnicity, and race in American psychology. *American Psychologist*, 48, 629-637.
- Biswas-Diener, R., & Diener, E. (2001). Making the best of a bad situation: Satisfaction in the slums of Calcutta. *Social Indicators Research*, 55, 329-352.
- Biswas-Diener, R., Vittersø, J., & Diener, E. (2005). Most people are pretty happy, but there is cultural variation: The Inghuit, the Amish, and the Maasai. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 6, 205-226.
- Brown, J. D., & Kobayashi, C. (2002). Self-enhancement in Japan and America. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 5, 145-168.
- Brown, J. D., & Kobayashi, C. (2003). Motivation and manifestation: Cross-cultural expression of the self-enhancement motive. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 6, 85-88.
- Cantril, H. (1965). *The pattern of human concerns*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Caspi, A., Sugden, K., Moffitt, T. E., Taylor, A., Craig, I. W., Harrington, H., et al. (2003). Influence of life stress on depression: Moderation by a polymorphism in the 5-HTT gene. *Science*, 301, 386-389.
- Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1991). Genes, peoples, and languages. *Scientific American*, 256(5), 104-110.
- Chirkov, V., Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y., & Kaplan, U. (2003). Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-

- being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 97-110.
- Cohen, D., & Gunz, A. (2002). As seen by the other: Perspective on the self in the memories and emotional perceptions of Easterners and Westerners. *Psychological Science*, 13, 55-59.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). *Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior*. New York: Plenum.
- The Dhammapadam: The sayings of the Buddha* (T. Byron, Trans.). (1976). New York: Random House.
- Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. *Psychological Bulletin*, 95, 542-575.
- Diener, E., & Diener, C. (1996). Most people are happy. *Psychological Science*, 7, 181-185.
- Diener, E., & Diener, M. (1995). Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68, 653-663.
- Diener, E., Diener, M., & Diener, C. (1995). Factors predicting the subjective well-being of nations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69, 851-864.
- Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The Satisfaction with Life Scale. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 49, 71-75.
- Diener, E., Gohm, C. L., Suh, E., & Oishi, S. (2000). Similarity of the relations between marital status and subjective well-being across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 31, 419-436.
- Diener, E., Horwitz, J., & Emmons, R. (1985). Happiness of the very wealthy. *Social Indicators Research*, 16, 263-274.
- Diener, E., Lucas, R. E., & Scollon, C. N. (2006). Beyond the hedonic treadmill: Revising the adaptation theory of well-being. *American Psychologist*, 61, 305-314.
- Diener, E., & Oishi, S. (2000). Money and happiness. In E. Diener & E.M. Suh (Eds.), *Culture and subjective well-being* (pp. 185-218). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Diener, E., Sandvik, E., Seidlitz, L., & Diener, M. (1993). The relationship between income and subjective well-being: Relative or absolute? *Social Indicators Research*, 28, 195-223.
- Diener, E., Scollon, C. K. N., Oishi, S., Dzokoto, V., & Suh, E. M. (2000). Positivity and the construction of life satisfaction judgments: Global happiness is not the sum of its parts. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 1, 159-176.
- Diener, E., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Beyond money: Toward an economy of well-being. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 5, 1-31.
- Diener, E., & Suh, E. M. (1999). National differences in subjective well-being. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), *Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology* (pp. 434-450). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Smith, H., & Shao, L. (1995). National differences in reported subjective well-being: Why do they occur? *Social Indicators Research*, 34, 7-32.
- Diener, M. L., Fujita, F., Kim-Prieto, C., & Diener, E. (2004). *Culture and emotional experience*. Unpublished manuscript, University of Utah.
- Diener, M. L., & Lucas, R. E. (2004). Adult's desires for children's emotions across 48 countries: Associations with individual and national characteristics. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35, 525-547.
- Edgerton, R. B. (1992). *Sick societies: Challenging the myth of primitive harmony*. New York: Free Press.
- Eid, M., & Diener, E. (2001). Norms for experiencing emotions in different cultures: Inter- and intranational differences. *Journal of Social and Personality Psychology*, 81, 869-885.
- Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. *Journal of Social and Personality Psychology*, 17, 124-129.
- Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., O'Sullivan, M., Chan, A., Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis, I., Heider, K., et al. (1987). Universals and cultural differences in the judgments of facial expressions of emotion. *Journal of Social and Personality Psychology*, 53, 712-717.
- Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). What good are positive emotions? *Review of General Psychology*, 2, 300-319.
- Freedman, D. G., & Freedman, N. C. (1969). Behavioural differences between Chinese-American and European-American newborns. *Nature*, 224, 1227.
- Fujita, F., & Diener, E. (2005). Life satisfaction set point: Stability and change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 158-164.
- Gaskins, R. W. (1999). "Adding legs to a snake": A reanalysis of motivation and the pursuit of happiness from a Zen Buddhist perspective. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 91, 204-215.
- Gohm, C. L., Oishi, S., Darlington, J., & Diener, E. (1998). Culture, parental conflict, parental marital status, and the subjective well-being of young adults. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 60, 319-334.
- Haritatos, J., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2002). Bicultural identities: The interface of cultural, personality, and socio-cognitive processes. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 36, 598-606.
- Heine, S. J. (2003). Self-enhancement in Japan?: A reply to Brown and Kobayashi. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 6, 75-84.
- Heine, S. J., Kitayama, S., Lehman, D. R., Takata, T., Ide, E., Leung, C., et al. (2001). Divergent consequences of success and failure in Japan and North America: An investigation of self-improving motivations and malleable selves. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81, 599-615.
- Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal need for positive self-regard? *Psychological Review*, 106, 766-794.
- Hermans, H. J. M., & Kempen, H. J. G. (1998). Moving cultures: The perilous problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society. *American Psychologist*, 53, 1111-1120.
- Hong, Y., & Chiu, C. (2001). Toward a paradigm shift: From cross cultural differences in social cognition to

- social-cognitive mediation of cultural differences. *Social Cognition*, 19, 181–196.
- Howell, C. J., Howell, R. T., & Schwabe, K. A. (2006). Does wealth enhance life satisfaction for people who are materially deprived?: Exploring the association among the *Orang Asli* of Peninsular Malaysia. *Social Indicators Research*, 76, 499–524.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H.-D. (2000). Genes, culture, democracy, and happiness. In E. Diener & E. M. Suh (Eds.), *Culture and subjective well-being* (pp. 185–218). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Ito, T. A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1999). The psychophysiology of utility appraisals. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwartz (Eds.), *Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology* (pp. 470–488). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Izard, C. E., & Malatesta, C. Z. (1987). Perspectives on emotional development I: Differential emotions theory of early emotional development. In J. D. Osofsky (Ed.), *Handbook of infant development* (2nd ed., pp. 494–554). New York: Wiley.
- Johnson, T., Kulesa, P., Cho, Y. I., & Shavitt, S. (2005). The relation between culture and response styles: Evidence from 19 countries. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 36, 264–277.
- Kagan, J., Arcus, D., Smidman, N., Feng, W. Y., Hendler, J., & Greene, S. (1994). Reactivity in infants: A cross-national comparison. *Developmental Psychology*, 30, 342–345.
- Kang, S.-M., Shaver, P. R., Sue, S., Min, K.-H., & Jing, H. (2003). Culture-specific patterns in the prediction of life satisfaction: Roles of emotion, relationship quality, and self esteem. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29, 1596–1608.
- Kim, D.-Y. (2004). The implicit life satisfaction measure. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 7, 236–262.
- Kim, D.-Y., Sarason, B., & Sarason, I. G. (2006). Implicit social cognition and culture: Explicit and implicit psychological acculturation, and distress of Korean-American young adults. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 25, 1–32.
- Kim-Prieto, C. Y. (2005). *Culture's influence on experienced and remembered emotions*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
- Kim-Prieto, C., & Diener, E. (2004). *Religion's role in cultural differences in emotional experiences*. Unpublished manuscript, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
- Kitayama, S., & Markus, H. R. (2000). The pursuit of happiness and the realization of sympathy: Cultural patterns of self, social relations, and well-being. In E. Diener & E. M. Suh (Eds.), *Culture and subjective well-being* (pp. 113–161). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Kurokawa, M. (2000). Culture, emotion, and well-being: Good feelings in Japan and the United States. *Cognition and Emotion*, 14, 93–124.
- Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit, V. (1997). Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: Self-enhancement in the United States and self-criticism in Japan. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72, 1245–1267.
- Kuppens, P., Ceulemans, E., Timmerman, M. E., Diener, E., & Kim-Prieto, C. (2006). Universal intracultural and intercultural dimensions of the recalled frequency of emotional experience. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 37, 491–515.
- Kwan, V. S. Y., Bond, M. H., & Singelis, T. M. (1997). Pancultural explanations for life satisfaction: Adding relationship harmony to self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73, 1038–1051.
- Lesch, K.-P., Bengel, D., Heils, A., Sabol, S. Z., Greenberg, B. D., Petri, S., et al. (1996). Association of anxiety-related traits with a polymorphism in the serotonin transporter gene regulatory region. *Science*, 274, 1527–1531.
- Levy, R. I. (1982). On the nature and functions of the emotions: An anthropological perspective. *Social Science Information*, 21, 511–528.
- Lucas, R. E., Diener, E., Grob, A., Suh, E. M., & Shao, L. (2000). Cross-cultural evidence for the fundamental features of extraversion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79, 452–468.
- Lutz, C. A. (1988). *Unnatural emotions: Everyday sentiments on a Micronesian atoll and their challenge to Western theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lykken, D., & Tellegen, A. (1996). Happiness is a stochastic phenomenon. *Psychological Science*, 7, 186–188.
- Lyubomirsky, S., King, L., & Diener, E. (2005). The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does happiness lead to success? *Psychological Bulletin*, 131, 803–855.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98, 224–253.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1994). The cultural construction of self and emotion: Implications for social behavior. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence* (pp. 89–130). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Maslow, A. H. (1954). *Motivation and personality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Menon, U., & Shweder, R. A. (1994). Kali's tongue: Cultural psychology and the power of shame in Orissa, India. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence* (pp. 241–284). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Mesquita, B., & Frijda, N. H. (1992). Cultural variations in emotions: A review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 112, 179–204.

- Mesquita, B., Fridja, N. H., & Scherer, K. R. (1997). Culture and emotion. In J. W. Berry, P. R. Dasen, & T. S. Saraswathi (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology* (2nd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 255-297). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Miller, P. J., Wang, S., Sandel, T., & Cho, G. E. (2002). Self-esteem as folk theory: A comparison of European American and Taiwanese mother's beliefs. *Parenting: Science and Practice*, 2, 209-239.
- No, S., & Hong, Y.-Y. (2004, January). *Negotiating bicultural identity: Contrast and assimilation effects in cultural frame switching*. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Austin, TX.
- Oishi, S. (2000). Goals as cornerstones of subjective well-being. In E. Diener & E. M. Suh (Eds.), *Culture and subjective well-being* (pp. 87-112). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Oishi, S. (2002). The experience and remembering of well-being: A cross-cultural analysis. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 1398-1406.
- Oishi, S., & Diener, E. (2001). Goals, culture, and subjective well-being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 1674-1682.
- Oishi, S., Diener, E. F., Lucas, R. E., & Suh, E. M. (1999). Cross-cultural variations in predictors of life satisfaction: Perspectives from needs and values. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25, 980-990.
- Oishi, S., Diener, E., Scollon, C. N., & Biswas-Diener, R. (2003). Cross-situational consistency of affective experiences across cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 86, 460-472.
- Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., & Colcombe, S. J. (2003). The contextual and systematic nature of life satisfaction judgments. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 39, 232-247.
- Ortony, A., & Turner, T. J. (1990). What's basic about basic emotions? *Psychological Review*, 97, 315-331.
- Park, N., & Huebner, E. S. (2005). A cross-cultural study of the levels and correlates of life satisfaction among adolescents. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 36, 444-456.
- Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. *American Psychologist*, 54, 741-754.
- Plutchik, R. (1980). *Emotion: A psychoevolutionary synthesis*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Radhakrishnan, P., & Chan, D. K.-S. (1997). Cultural differences in the relation between self-discrepancy and life satisfaction. *International Journal of Psychology*, 32, 387-398.
- Rice, T. W., & Steele, B. J. (2004). Subjective well-being and culture across time and space. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35, 633-647.
- Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. *American Psychologist*, 55, 68-78.
- Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. (1998). The contours of positive human health. *Psychological Inquiry*, 9, 1-28.
- Schimmack, U., Diener, E., & Oishi, S. (2002). Life-satisfaction is a momentary judgment and a stable personality characteristic: The use of chronically accessible and stable sources. *Journal of Personality*, 70, p. 345-384.
- Schimmack, U., Oishi, S., & Diener, E. (2002). Cultural influences on the relation between pleasant emotions and unpleasant emotions: Asian dialectic philosophies or individualism-collectivism? *Cognition and Emotion*, 16, 705-719.
- Schimmack, U., Radhakrishnan, P., Oishi, S., Dzokoto, V., & Ahadi, S. (2002). Culture, personality, and subjective well-being: Integrating process models of life satisfaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82, 582-593.
- Schwarz, N., & Strack, F. (1999). Reports of subjective well-being: Judgmental processes and their methodological implications. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), *Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology* (pp. 61-84). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Scollon, C. N., Diener, E., Oishi, S., Biswas-Diener, R. (2004). Emotions across cultures and methods. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35, 304-326.
- Shao, L. (1993). *Multilanguage comparability of life satisfaction and happiness measures in mainland Chinese and American students*. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
- Shaver, P. R., Wu, S., & Schwartz, J. C. (1992). Cross-cultural similarities and differences in emotion and its representation: A prototype approach. *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, 13, 175-212.
- Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Ryan, R. M., Chirkov, V., Kim, Y., Wu, C., et al. (2004). Self-concordance and subjective well-being in four cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35, 209-223.
- Shweder, R. A. (2000). Moral maps, "First World" conceits, and the new evangelists. In L. E. Harrison & S. P. Huntington (Eds.), *Culture matters: How values shape human progress* (pp. 158-172). New York: Basic Books.
- Smith, P. B. (2004). Acquiescent response bias as an aspect of cultural communication style. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35, 50-61.
- Snibbe, A. C., & Markus, H. R. (2005). You can't always get what you want: Educational attainment, agency, and choice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 703-720.
- Suh, E., Diener, E., Oishi, S., & Triandis, H. C. (1998). The shifting basis of life satisfaction judgments across cultures: Emotions versus norms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 482-493.
- Suh, E. M. (2002). Culture, identity consistency, and subjective well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83, 1378-1391.
- Thompson, J. (1941). Development of facial expression

- of emotion in blind and seeing children. *Archives of Psychology*, (No. 264).
- Tomkins, S. S. (1962). *Affect, imagery, and consciousness: Vol. 1. The positive affects*. New York: Springer.
- Tomkins, S. S. (1963). *Affect, imagery, and consciousness: Vol. 2. The negative affects*. New York: Springer.
- Tsai, J., Knutson, B., & Fung, H. H. (2006). Cultural variation in affect valuation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90, 288–307.
- Veenhoven, R. (n.d.). Distributional findings in nations. In *World database of happiness*. Retrieved September 5, 2004, from www.eur.nl/ifsu/research/happiness
- Veenhoven, R. (1991). Is happiness relative? *Social Indicators Research*, 24, 1–34.
- Veenhoven, R. (1993). *Happiness in nations*. Rotterdam, the Netherlands: Risbo.
- Veenhoven, R. (2001). Are the Russians as unhappy as they say they are?: Comparability of self-reports across nations. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 2, 111–136.
- Vittersø, J., Røysamb, E., & Diener, E. (2002). The concept of life satisfaction across cultures: Exploring its diverse meaning and relation to economic wealth. In E. Gullone & R. A. Cummins (Eds.), *The universality of subjective well-being indicators* (pp. 81–103). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
- Wallbott, H. G., & Scherer, K. (1988). How universal and specific is emotional experience?: Evidence from 27 countries on five continents. In K. R. Scherer (Ed.), *Facets of emotion: Recent research* (pp. 31–56). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1984). Cross-cultural convergence in the structure of mood: A Japanese replication and a comparison with U.S. findings. *Journal of Social and Personality Psychology*, 47, 127–144.
- Wierzbicka, A. (1986). Human emotions: Universal or culture-specific? *American Anthropologist*, 88, 584–594.
- Wirtz, D. (2004). *Focusing on the good versus focusing on the bad: An analysis of East-West differences in subjective well-being*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
- Wu, W. C. H., & Bond, M. H. (2006). National differences in predictors of suicide among young and elderly citizens: Linking societal predictors to psychological factors. *Archives of Suicide Research*, 10, 45–60.
- Yang, K. S. (2003). Beyond Maslow's culture-bound linear theory: A preliminary statement of the double-Y model of basic human needs. In V. Murphy-Berman & J. J. Berman (Eds.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 49. Cross-cultural differences in perspectives on the self* (pp. 176–255). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.